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The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module G:
The Auto Warranty Commitment Program1
Benjamin Henken2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
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Abstract
On March 30, 2009, President Barack Obama announced a plan for government-funded
protection of warranties on new vehicles sold by General Motors (GM) and Chrysler while
the companies underwent restructuring. The initiative, which would become known as the
Auto Warranty Commitment Program (AWCP), was intended to bolster consumer
confidence by alleviating a major risk—the loss of warranty benefits—to consumers
associated with the companies’ potential bankruptcies. Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler
established independent special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to which they transferred a
combination of their own money along with funding they received from Treasury in the form
of a loan. The SPV then acted as an insurance fund, guaranteeing the availability of cash to
respond to eligible warranty claims should either company fail or otherwise become unable
to meet new claims on its own. The program closed on July 21, 2009, without either
company’s SPV having been called into action. At the time of its announcement, the program
received generally positive reviews from some in the industry and media, although there
were concerns that the program would be more difficult to implement than the
administration had described.

1 This case is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) modules considering the various elements

of the government’s rescue of the US auto Industry and published in 2022:
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module A: Automotive Bridge Loans” by Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module B: Restructuring General Motors Through Bankruptcy”
by Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module C: Restructuring Chrysler Through Bankruptcy” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module D: Emergency Assistance to Ally Financial (formerly
GMAC)” by Riki Matsumoto and Kaleb B. Nygaard.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module E: Emergency Assistance for Chrysler Financial” by
Alexander Nye.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module F: Auto Supplier Support Program” by Riki Matsumoto.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module G: The Auto Warranty Commitment Program” by
Benjamin Henken.
• “The Rescue of the US Auto Industry, Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Greg Feldberg,
Alexander Nye, and Andrew Metrick.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.2021.
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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Auto Warranty Commitment Program
At a Glance
On March 30, 2009, President Barack Obama
delivered a speech on the government’s
support and restructuring of General Motors
(GM) and Chrysler. The two companies had
just failed to receive approval for their
restructuring plans from the President’s
Auto Task Force and, as a result, were
refused the long-term funding they had been
seeking.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To fund guarantees of warranties on all
new vehicles sold by General Motors and Chrysler
while they underwent a government-assisted
bankruptcy and restructuring
Announcement date
Termination date
Legal authority
Total commitment
Peak utilization
Term of loan

March 30, 2009
July 10, 2009
Troubled Assets Relief
Program
$1.1 billion
$640.7 million
July 31, 2010 (in the case
of GM) and June 30,
2010 (in the case of
Chrysler)
The greater of LIBOR +
350 basis points (bp)
and 550 bp
$5.5 million
General Motors Corp.;
Chrysler LLC

Given the scope of the challenges GM and
Chrysler confronted, President Obama
stressed the growing possibility of their
having to file for bankruptcy. But rather than
leading to their liquidation, bankruptcy Interest rate
would be used as a restructuring “tool” to
allow the companies to swiftly dispose of
legacy debts while still being able to Net revenue
Participants/borrowers
maintain operations. However, due to
negative public perceptions of bankruptcy,
Administrator/lender
US Dept. of the Treasury
government
officials
and
company
executives feared that simply introducing its possibility—no matter how much sense it made
for the companies—would drain public confidence in the firms, posing yet another risk to
their viability as demand for their vehicles plummeted.
Therefore, at the same time, President Obama also announced a plan for a governmentfunded guarantee of consumer warranties on GM and Chrysler vehicles purchased while they
underwent restructuring. The initiative, which would become known as the Auto Warranty
Commitment Program (AWCP), was intended to bolster consumer confidence by alleviating
the risk of loss of auto warranty benefits associated with the companies’ potential
bankruptcies. Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler established independent special purpose
vehicles (SPVs) to which they transferred a combination of their own money and funding
they received from the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in the form of a loan. The
SPV then acted as an insurance fund, guaranteeing the availability of cash to respond to
eligible warranty claims should either company fail or otherwise become unable to meet
those claims on its own.
At the outset, Treasury dedicated up to $1.1 billion for the AWCP’s implementation. In the
end, it extended a total of $640.7 million in loans to GM and Chrysler. The program closed on
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July 21, 2009, without either company’s SPV having been required to pay warranty claims.
Treasury recouped all loan principal and netted $5.5 million in interest payments.
Summary Evaluation
Given its size relative to the other components of the auto industry rescue, the AWCP has
received comparatively little scrutiny from the academic community. No analysis has
attempted to isolate its effect on demand for the companies’ vehicles or its overall impact on
GM and Chrysler’s restructuring efforts.
At the time of its announcement, the AWCP received a generally positive reception from
those in the auto industry as well as the media, although there were concerns that the
program was too vague and that its proper implementation—if necessary—would be
difficult.
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Auto Warranty Commitment Program: United States Context 2008–2009
GDP
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
to USD)
GDP per capita
$48,383 in 2008
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
$47,100 in 2009
to USD)
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
Sovereign credit rating
S&P: AAA
(5-year senior debt)
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Size of banking system
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009
Size of banking system as a percentage
68.3% in 2008
of GDP
66.9% in 2009
Size of banking system as a percentage
of financial system
5-bank concentration of banking
system

30.5% in 2008
30.2% in 2009
45% in 2008
44% in 2009

Foreign involvement in banking
system
Government ownership of banking
system

18% in 2008
16% in 2009
0% in 2008
0% in 2009
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2009
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank, Bank Regulation and Supervision
Survey.
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Overview

Background
During the fall of 2008, as General Motors (GM) and Chrysler headed toward collapse, they
repeatedly asked the US government for emergency support. On December 19, 2008, the US
Treasury, at the direction of President George W. Bush, agreed to extend emergency bridge
loans to the companies so that they could fulfill their immediate liquidity requirements. The
bridge loans were positioned as stopgap measures designed to achieve two main purposes:
(1) to ensure that GM and Chrysler would survive the presidential transition, and (2) to force
the companies to revamp their business models and begin restructuring into long-term
viable entities (Paulson 2010).
Pursuant to the bridge loan agreements, GM and Chrysler received a total of $23.4 billion in
emergency funding on the condition that, among other criteria, they would design and
implement in-depth restructuring plans. The plans were to be reviewed by the President’s
Auto Task Force, whose evaluation was key to determining whether the government would
fund the companies through their restructuring (COP 2009).
On March 30, 2009, when President Obama announced that the Task Force’s review was
complete, he disclosed that, in the Auto Task Force’s view, neither company had formulated
a plan that was likely to lead to viability. As a result, GM and Chrysler were refused the longterm government investments they were seeking. But rather than cut off their funding
entirely, the Obama Administration agreed to lend them additional working capital designed
to last the next 30 days (Chrysler) and 60 days (GM), on the condition that they use the time
to work with the government to create viable restructuring plans (Treasury 2009b; Obama
2009).
At the same time, President Obama announced to the public that, even with the introduction
of viable restructuring plans, GM and Chrysler were unlikely to avoid filing for bankruptcy.
Rather than force their liquidation, bankruptcy would be used as a restructuring “tool” that
would facilitate swift reorganizations. GM and Chrysler could “quickly clear away old debt”
while maintaining operations. But both government officials and company executives feared
that simply introducing the possibility of bankruptcy, no matter how much sense it made for
the companies, would drain public confidence in the firms, posing more systemic risks
(Treasury 2009b; Obama 2009).
Program Description
On March 30, 2009, President Obama also announced government-funded protection3 of
consumer warranties on GM and Chrysler vehicles purchased while they underwent

While sometimes called a “government guarantee,” technically, under the AWCP, the government did not
provide a guarantee. It was the related non-government SPVs (established by the participating auto
manufacturers) that guaranteed the warranties. The government, in this case Treasury, indirectly provided
3
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restructuring (Treasury 2009b; Obama 2009). The new Auto Warranty Commitment
Program (AWCP) was intended to “give consumers who [were] considering new car
purchases the confidence that even in this difficult economic period, their warrantees
[would] be honored.” Although the AWCP was announced in direct support of GM and
Chrysler, participation was open to all domestic automakers. GM and Chrysler, however,
were the only two manufacturers who chose to participate (Treasury 2009a).
Under the AWCP, GM and Chrysler each created a new, bankruptcy-remote, special purpose
vehicle (SPV) to which they transferred funding equal to 125% of the expected cost of
warranty obligations4 on each new vehicle they sold, 15% of which they provided
themselves and the remainder of which (110%) they funded with a Treasury loan (Treasury
2009a). In the event of a “Business Failure”5 or in the event that the automaker otherwise
became unable to meet its warranty obligations, the SPV would appoint (with Treasury’s
approval) one or more third-party program administrators to assume the automaker’s
warranty liabilities and be paid through the funding held by the SPV (Chrysler and Treasury
2009; GM and Treasury 2008; Treasury 2009a).
Terms of the Loans
Immediately following the announcement of the AWCP in March, Treasury dedicated up to
$1.1 billion in funding for its implementation. Of that, $640.7 million in loans were ultimately
disbursed for the establishment of each company’s AWCP SPV: $280.1 million to Chrysler on
April 29, 2009, and $360.6 million to GM on May 27 (Treasury 2018). These funds were
subsequently transferred by the two companies to their respective SPVs, as contemplated.
Treasury funded the loans through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), the $750
billion pool of money created under the Emergency Economic Stability Act of 2008 (EESA)
(EESA 2008). The loans carried an interest rate of the greater of 550 basis points (bp) or the
London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) plus 350 basis points. The loans came with
promissory notes for 6.67% of the value of any advances drawn upon under the AWCP but
were also secured by a commensurate stake in GM and Chrysler’s warranty SPVs6 and by
“Guaranty Collateral” that included a security interest in all of the collateral owned by the
relevant warranty SPV. The loans were drawn up as amendments to the loan and security
agreements originally entered into between Treasury and the automakers in December 2008
funding to support the SPVs’ commitments. More accurately, the government “provide[d] government-funded
protection for warrantees issued by participating domestic auto manufacturers” (Treasury 2009b). It labeled
the ACWP as the “Obama Administration’s New Warrantee Commitment Program” (Treasury 2009a).
4 For an automaker, the expected cost of a warranty, in simplified terms, is the likelihood of the warranty being
called upon multiplied by the average cost of fulfilling its obligations under the warranty (Chrysler and
Treasury 2008; GM and Treasury 2008).
5 The loan agreement between Treasury and each manufacturer defined a company failure as: “a bankruptcy,
other reorganization, restructuring or cessation of business of General Motors Corporation in which it or any
Subsidiary or Affiliate terminates, dishonors or rejects Limited Warranty Obligations, but excludes a
reorganization or restructuring for purposes of implementing a plan acceptable to [Treasury]” (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008).
6 While Treasury funding to GM and Chrysler for the AWCP was structured as a loan, the funding was used to
“capitalize” their SPVs, and so in return Treasury received a commensurate stake in each (Chrysler and
Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008).
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and January 2009 (Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008). For more
information on the original loan and security agreements, which facilitated the emergency
bridge loans, see Nye 2021.
The AWCP was set to expire on June 30, 2010, for Chrysler and on July 31, 2010, for GM. GM
and Chrysler could exit the program any time after they finished restructuring.7 Funding held
by the SPVs following a company’s exit from the program (assuming its exit was due to
completing restructuring and not failing) would be used first to pay interest and reduce
principal on the Treasury loan. GM and Chrysler would then be entitled to any funds left over
(Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008).
Outcomes
Programmatic
Soon after receiving the funding, both companies filed for bankruptcy and were supported
through that process by TARP debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans. By July 2009, both GM and
Chrysler had successfully emerged from bankruptcy, having completed the most essential
phase of their restructuring. By July 10, although other obligations to the government
remained outstanding, GM and Chrysler paid back all AWCP loan principal plus $5.5 million
in interest.8 The program subsequently closed without either company having called upon
the guarantee (SIGTARP 2009).
GM and Chrysler Vehicle Sales
As shown in Figure 1, consistent with broader market trends, GM’s net revenue from sales
began to decline in first-quarter 2008 and fell more sharply from fall 2008 through firstquarter 2009. Even though the company had yet to emerge from bankruptcy, its net revenue
from sales began to stabilize during second-quarter 2009 when the AWCP was implemented.
However, sales generally did not start to rebound until after GM’s completion of a major
restructuring and emergence from bankruptcy in the summer of 2009. Because Chrysler was
a private company prior to the crisis, quarterly data on its sales revenue were not publicly
available for comparison.

What it would mean to “finish restructuring” was left undefined, but presumably this meant emerging from
bankruptcy. To exit the program after finishing restructuring, the companies were required to provide written
notice to this effect.
8 Only Chrysler paid interest on the AWCP funding; GM repaid only the principal (Allison 2009). Chrysler repaid
the $280.1 million warranty loan and related interest due when other pre-bankruptcy loans (but not the
warranty loan) were transferred to the post-bankruptcy Chrysler. With respect to GM, it appears that the
principal of the $360.6 million warranty loan was transferred to new GM along with other pre-bankruptcy loan
obligations, but it is not clear why GM’s interest obligations from the warranty loan seem to have gone unpaid
(Treasury 2018).
7
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Figure 1: General Motors Net Sales Revenue, 2007–2010
Billions of dollars
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March 30, 2009
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Source: Compustat Capital IQ.

II.
1.

Key Design Decisions
The AWCP was a small part of Treasury’s broader initiative to rescue and
restructure the US auto industry.

The US government’s strategy for assisting the struggling US auto industry was largely adhoc and evolved considerably over time. Treasury’s original stated purpose for intervening
was to prevent the immediate collapse of GM and Chrysler—at the time two of the three
largest US automakers—an event that was widely expected to be destabilizing for the entire
industry (COP 2009). The AWCP constituted just $0.6 billion of the $79.7 billion in TARP
funding ultimately disbursed in support of GM and Chrysler’s restructurings and to assist
other key players in the industry as well, including two auto finance companies (General
Motors Acceptance Corporation and Chrysler Financial) and auto parts suppliers (Treasury
2018).
2.

Legal authority for intervention in the US auto industry came from the Troubled
Assets Relief Program.

Created with the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) in October
2008, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) enabled the US Treasury to “purchase and
insure certain types of assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing
disruption in the economy and financial system” (EESA 2008). In addition to targeting
distressed mortgage-related holdings of US financial institutions, the law also enabled
Treasury to purchase “any other financial instrument that the [Treasury] Secretary, after
consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
determines the purchase of which is necessary to promoting financial market stability”
(EESA 2008). That clause proved essential when, in December 2008, it became apparent
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that no resolution for the auto industry would take hold in Congress (Nye 2021). As a result,
the Bush Treasury used the flexibility built into EESA to justify extending GM and Chrysler
emergency loans (Bush 2008).
3.

President Obama announced the creation of the AWCP in a televised speech.

President Obama announced the warranty protection plan in a speech delivered to the
public on March 30, 2009, speaking directly to American consumers whom the program
targeted. Before discussing the AWCP, the President explained why the government was
assisting the automakers. He described the process that had been applied, including judging
their restructuring plans to be inadequate, and the decision to provide further working
capital to give the companies a second chance. In particular, the President explained how
bankruptcy might be employed as a “tool” to speed the restructuring of the automakers. He
then explained how the AWCP would work in broad terms, while also taking pains to
describe such things as automatic enrollment for purchases of eligible cars (Obama 2009).
The President’s speech was supplemented by the release of a program fact sheet on the
White House and Treasury websites (Treasury 2009a).
4.

The AWCP was open to participation by all domestic automakers.

Even though President Obama announced the program in support of GM and Chrysler, in its
fact sheet Treasury confirmed that “any domestic auto manufacturer [was] eligible to
participate in the program” (Treasury 2009a). No other manufacturers chose to participate
(Treasury 2018).
5.

The AWCP provided funding that indirectly guaranteed warranties on new
vehicles sold by GM and Chrysler during their restructuring to bolster consumer
confidence in the companies.

The looming threat of a GM or Chrysler bankruptcy had the potential to negatively and
possibly significantly affect demand for the companies’ vehicles. While President Obama
attempted to position bankruptcy as a valuable restructuring tool, there was great risk that
consumers would view the announcement as confirmation of the firms’ precarious futures,
and thus be hesitant to purchase one of their vehicles (COP 2009). For consumers,
bankruptcy put at risk the fulfillment of warranty benefits and would likely result in the
closure of many dealerships and service centers as well as a huge drop in vehicle resale value
(COP 2009; GM 2008). Given these risks, it was thought that some consumers would avoid
GM and Chrysler offerings entirely in favor of vehicles sold by financially sound automakers.
As a result, on March 30, 2009, at the same time that he announced the possibility of a GM or
Chrysler bankruptcy, President Obama also took the step of announcing a governmentfunded protection plan for warranties on vehicles the companies sold while restructuring.
While concern over the future of GM and Chrysler would remain, the program was intended
to alleviate a major risk associated with bankruptcy and, to the maximum extent possible,
bolster consumer confidence in their vehicles (Treasury 2009a).
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GM and Chrysler were required to create new SPVs to which they transferred
funding to be held in reserve in case of their failures.

The AWCP required a participating auto manufacturer to establish an independent
bankruptcy-remote SPV to guarantee the warranties; the guarantees did not flow from the
manufacturer or the government. Guarantees normally do not require upfront payments by
the guarantors; rather, auto manufacturers typically establish an accounting reserve to cover
the expected cost of providing warranty services on each newly sold vehicle. The AWCP
required Treasury and the participating manufacturers to pre-fund the SPV so that the
funding backing the guarantee would be set aside. In the event of either company’s failure,
the SPV, a separate legal entity, would remain financially able to meet the warranty
commitments (Treasury 2009a).
7.

Each SPV was funded by contributions from Treasury and the participating
automaker’s funding.

Each participating automaker and Treasury together contributed funding equal to 125% of
the expected cost of fulfilling warranties on eligible vehicles they projected to sell while
restructuring, with 88% contributed by Treasury and 12% contributed by the participant
(Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008).9 GM and Chrysler were responsible
for providing 15% of this amount (as 12% of 125% is 15% of the overall total) and funded
the remainder with a Treasury loan (Treasury 2009a). Treasury did not state why it divided
the funding in this manner.
The companies calculated the expected cost of warranty obligations using historical data on
warranty payouts in years past. If at any point during the program warranty cost
expectations increased by more than 10% (for example, by the companies selling more
vehicles than expected or due to an unforeseen increase in the average cost of fulfilling each
eligible warranty), the companies were required to deposit into the SPV additional funds to
cover this increase (Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008). The
administration agreements do not detail how this historical data would be used to compute
the expected cost of warranty data.
8.

Treasury extended loans to each participating manufacturer to support the
warranty commitment.

Treasury originally committed up to $1.1 billion for the program and ultimately disbursed
$640.7 million in loans. Treasury extended Chrysler a loan worth $280.1 million on April 29
and GM a loan worth $360.6 million on May 27 (Treasury 2018).
Treasury’s loans to each manufacturer had an interest rate of the greater of (1) the threemonth Libor plus 350 basis points, or (2) 550 basis points. The loans were payable by 30
days after the termination of the facility, which was June 30, 2010, for Chrysler and July 31,

Based on available information, it is unclear how long each company expected to be in restructuring and thus
over how long of a timeframe they projected these costs.
9
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2010, for GM (or, whichever was earlier, 30 days after the entrance of the warranty SPV into
an arrangement with a third-party administrator or 30 days after notice of a successfully
completed restructuring) (Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008). There is no
data available that explains why Treasury chose these dates to terminate the facility or why
the dates differ for the two automotive companies.
9.

Treasury’s loans were secured by a senior lien on the SPV’s assets after the
program’s end.

Treasury’s loan was designed to comprise 88% of the total funding in each warranty SPV. If
the AWCP ended with the funding in each company’s SPV having gone unused, Treasury
would be entitled to receive what it had accrued. However, if one of the companies failed
and its SPV had to be put to use, Treasury had no recourse other than its investment plus any
interest that might remain after the program’s end. Treasury stood first in line (ahead of the
companies) to receive any funding left over (Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury
2008)
10. Consumers who purchased an eligible vehicle were automatically registered for
the program.
To be eligible, a vehicle had to be new and sold by a participating automaker while it
restructured. For those purchasing an eligible vehicle, registration for the program was
“automatic.” As explained to consumers on the AWCP Fact Sheet: “You do not have to do
anything to receive the US commitment to your warrantee [sic]. It is automatic” (Treasury
2009a). President Obama stated the same in his speech announcing the program (Obama
2009). Individuals owning a GM or Chrysler vehicle at the time of the program’s
announcement, or purchasing a used car during the restructuring, would continue to be
covered by outstanding warranties, but would not receive benefits under the AWCP
(Treasury 2009a).
11. The failure of either automaker would trigger a search for a third party capable of
taking over its warranty obligations.
If GM or Chrysler were to fail, its SPV would be given a 10-day period during which to try to
locate a third party willing to accept the warranty obligations in exchange for the funding it
held. If the 10-day period passed and no suitor was found, Treasury’s program
administrator would seek to carry out this. During this time, the program administrator
would be responsible for fulfilling a range of duties, including structuring the processing of
claims, assuring their validity, cutting down on fraud, and doing “other administrative
functions” as needed (Chrysler and Treasury 2009; GM and Treasury 2008). The
government believed it would not be difficult to find a suitor. “Because of the significant
funding of the reserve account, Treasury is confident that qualified third parties will be
interested in taking over the warranty obligations” (Treasury 2009a).
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12. The Canadian government simultaneously guaranteed warranties on new GM and
Chrysler vehicles sold in Canada.
Canada established a warranty guarantee program similar to the AWCP. The Canadian
Warranty Commitment Program, announced on April 7, 2009, supported new vehicle
warranties for GM and Chrysler customers with the “goal . . . to increase consumer confidence
and encourage Canadians to buy new cars” (Industry Canada 2009a). The program ended on
September 16, 2009, after both companies emerged from bankruptcy (Industry Canada
2009b).
The Canadian government stated:
Under the Canadian Warranty Commitment Program, the federal government is
committed to honouring consumer warranties on new vehicles purchased from GMCL
or Chrysler Canada for a limited period while improved restructuring plans are put
in place (Industry Canada 2009a).
It described the warranty program as one that “paralleled the US warranty program
announced by President Barack Obama on March 30, 2009” (Industry Canada 2009a).
It appears that segregated information about the warranty commitments appears not to be
publicly available. The Auditor General of Canada criticized the lack of publc information
about the use of the government’s loans, including the warranty program: “Industry Canada
had limited documentation on the actual use of a $2.8 billion loan made to GM Canada for
capital expenditures, warranty claims, and other general corporate purposes.” (Auditor
General Canada, Section 5.45).

III. Evaluation
Given its size relative to the other components of the auto industry rescue, the AWCP has
received comparatively little scrutiny from the academic community. No analysis has
attempted to isolate its effect on demand for the companies’ vehicles nor its overall impact
on GM and Chrysler’s restructuring efforts. However, the AWCP did roughly coincide with
auto sales’ lowest point in the recession (Goolsbee and Kruger 2015). This raises the
possibility that the AWCP may have helped stabilize sales during this time.
At the time of its announcement, the AWCP received a generally positive reception from
those in the auto industry as well as the media, although there were concerns that the
program was too vague and that its implementation, if necessary, might be difficult. On the
positive end, Joe Serra, president of a major US dealership group, called the initiative a gamechanger, suggesting it would go a long way toward making consumers comfortable with
buying a car from the companies (Roland and Truett 2009). Clarence Ditlow, executive
director of the Center for Auto Safety, criticized the program for not backing current vehicle
owners and pointed out that safety recalls can occur years after warranties expire. He also
questioned whether it would be as easy as Treasury thought to find a third-party warranty
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service provider to take over the program in the event the companies went out of business
(Fox News 2009).

IV.
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